Abstract: This paper shows that a collection of modal relevant logics are conservatively extended by the addition of Boolean negation.
D
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Bob Meyer. Bob was our friend and colleague. We miss him greatly.
I
This paper is a sequel to [12] . That paper is concerned with modal relevant logic, in particular logics close to Meyer's system NR. NR was first developed as a tool to analyze the logic of entailment. The notion of entailment had been formalized by Anderson and Belnap in logic the logic E (for 'entailment') that had a conditional that incorporates both the notion of a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent and the concept of a necessary connection between the two. It is, in short, the relevant version of strict implication. This dual nature of entailment, however, suggests that the two notions can be separated, using a contingent relevant implication and a necessity operator. Taking up this suggestion, Meyer created NR, which combined the logic R (the logic of contingent relevant implication) with the modal logic S4. But it turned out that the fragment of this logic that is supposed to mimic E-conjunction, disjunction, negation, and necessary relevant implication-is slightly stronger than E.
NR turned out, however, to be interesting in its own right. Its approach to combining relevance and modality has been adopted and generalized by several authors (see, e.g., [2] and [4] ). It is the ancestor of today's relevant temporal logics [20] , relevant deontic logics [5] , and relevant counterfactual logics (see [2] ), and so on. One such related logic is R4. R4 differs from NR in that it contains all instances of the following scheme:
The original interest in adding this scheme is the , ∧, ∨, ¬ fragment of the resulting logic is just S4. Thus, from the point of view of R4, we might think of S4 as a good logic-it is only deficient in that it does not have a real implication connective.
In the previous paper, we did not discover whether CR4-R4 together with a boolean negation-is a conservative extension of R4. And this paper will not provide an answer to this question either. But it will look at several other systems very close to R4, that include the scheme (!), and prove that the boolean extension of each of these is conservative.
The original motivation for relevant logic is to avoid the paradoxes of implication, some of which essentially involve negation, such as ex falso ((p ∧ ¬p) → q). To avoid these paradoxes, relevant logic replaces boolean negation with a weaker DeMorgan negation. So, the question arises, whether the addition of a boolean negation will affect the rest of a relevant logic-will it alter the properties and relationships between implication, DeMorgan negation, and the other connectives? In [13] and [14] Meyer and Routley discovered that boolean negation can be conservatively added to R. This did not turn out to be the case, however, for NR [12] or E [9] . So, it seems that at least some modal relevant logics are fragile when it comes to the addition of a boolean negation. The formula that was used to prove that CNR and CE are not conservative extensions of their non-boolean kin is
This formula is a theorem of CNR and CE but not of NR or E. It is, however, a theorem of all of the systems that we examine. This is one reason why the question that we are solving is interesting.
Another motivation for this paper comes from proof theory. In [3] and [15] , J.M. Dunn and Grigori Mints present sequent calculi for R that have two sorts of structural connectives-extensional and intensional connectives. Nuel Belnap has adopted and generalized this idea in his display logic. Belnap uses not only structural connectives that correspond to conjunction and disjunction, but he also employs structural negations. The advantage of having a boolean (or extensional) structural negation is that it can be used together with extensional conjunction and disjunction in versions of the antilogism rule, such as
where • e is the extensional conjunction or disjunction (depending on whether it is on the left or right side of the turnstile) and * e is the extensional structural negation. Belnap has used the Routley-Meyer proof of conservative extension to prove that this use of extensional negation is harmless. To do this, he uses the fact that proofs in his display logic can be translated straightforwardly into valid proofs in the Hilbert system for CR (see [1] §62). 1 
T L
The logic that we use as our base logic is called R.K − . The minus sign indicates that the following thesis of R4 is missing from R.K − (and from all the other logics that we examine here):
The reason that we do not include it is that its associated semantic postulate 2 cannot be proven to hold in the canonical model of section 6 below. Whether the logics that include this thesis (as well as (!) and the other axioms of our base system) are conservatively extended by the addition of boolean negation is still and open question.
Although the loss of (A → B) → ( A → B) clearly weakens the logic, it does not do so very much. All the logics that we examine are closed under the rule RM, that is,
A → B and contain the thesis ( A ∧ B) → (A ∧ B). Together with some standard R-moves we can prove
The language L contains a non-empty set of propositional variables, the unary connective ¬, the binary connectives ∧, • (fusion or intensional conjunction), and →, and parentheses. Standard formation rules hold. We also define the following connectives:
1 In the case of E, whose boolean extension is not conservative, Belnap uses another method. The use of conservative extension results is not essential, but very convenient.
2 Which is ∃x(Rabx ∧ Sxc) ⇒ ∃x∃y(Sax ∧ Sby ∧ Rxyc), and is known, for obvious reasons, as "Hume's dictum". 
The following is an axiomatization of R.K − :
We can extend R.K − by the addition of any subset of the following list of axiom schemes and the conservative extension theorem will hold of the resulting logic:
In what follows we make use of the following lemma.
Proof: Straightforward.
N T
In this section we prove that R.K − and the other logics are characterized by the class of their prime consistent theories that contain all their theorems. The proof is by means of Meyer's method of metavaluations. A metavaluation is a process whereby we take a prime theory containing all the theorems of a logic and shrink it to a consistent such theory. But before we can explain properly what a metavaluation is, we to give some definitions and to prove a few lemmas. Where Γ is a set of formulas,
. A set of formulas Σ is said to be a Γ -theory if, for any formula A, if Σ Γ A, then A ∈ Σ. Σ is said to be prime if for any disjunction A ∨ B ∈ Σ, at least one of A or B is in Σ. And a pair of sets of formulas (Σ, ∆) is called independent if Σ Γ ∆. A theory is regular if it contains all the theorems of R.K − and it is normal if it is prime, regular, and negation consistent. Where Γ is just the set of R.K − theorems, we call Γ -theories 'R.K − -theories' or merely 'theories'. If (Σ, ∆) is R.K − -independent, then we merely say '(Σ, ∆) is independent'. We only use the notion of independence, not the more general notion of Γ -independence in this section, but when it comes to proving completeness we will need the more general notion.
The following lemma is the standard Lindenbaum lemma for relevant logics, due originally to Dov Gabbay and Nuel Belnap.
We now prove some preliminary lemmas.
 3 If Γ is a prime theory and there is a
Proof: Suppose that Γ is a prime theory and there is a A ∈ Γ but no ♦B is in Γ . By axiom 5, A → (A ∨ C) and so by RM,
As usual, we define −1 Γ to be the set of all formulas A such that A ∈ Γ and ♦ −1 Γ to be the set of all formulas B such that ♦B ∈ Γ .
 4 If Γ is a prime theory, then A ∈ Γ iff for all prime theories
Proof: ⇒ obvious. ⇐ Case 1. Suppose that there are no formulas B such that ♦B ∈ Γ . Then there are no theories that are a subset of ♦ −1 Γ . But by Lemma 3 for every formula C C ∈ Γ .
Case 2. There is at least one formula
We show that ( −1 Γ, ∆ Γ ) is independent. Suppose not. There there are some G 1 , . . . , G n ∈ −1 Γ and B 1 , . . . , B m ∈ {B :
Then, by the rule RM, axioms 3, 13, 14, 15 (and a few applications of modus ponens),
Thus, since Γ is a prime theory, either A ∈ Γ or at least one of ♦B 1 , . . . , ♦B m is in Γ . But, by hypothesis, none of these formulas are in Γ and so by reductio we conclude that ( −1 Γ, ∆ Γ ) is independent as required.
By Lemma 2, we can expand −1 Γ to a prime theory Γ such that
Now we can give the definition of a metavaluation and proceed to the main part of the proof.
 5 (Kripke Metavaluation) For a regular prime theory Γ , we define | = M as follows: (Mp) for all propositional variables p,
This notion of a metavaluation is named after Kripke because it in effect constructs a Kripke model out of the set of prime regular theories and reduces the whole set simultaneously to normal theories.
We now prove that for each regular prime theory
indicates that it is closed under conjunction, and (M→) entails that it is closed under modus ponens. But we still need to show that it is a prime, regular theory.
Following standard practice in relevant logic, we define
The following lemma can be proven in exactly the same was as it is in [8] :
Then, by Lemma 6, A / ∈ Γ * , so by definition of * , ¬A ∈ Γ . Hence by our hypothesis and (M¬), ¬A ∈ M(Γ ).
Lemma 6 also allows us to prove that M(Γ ) is prime. For suppose that A ∨ B ∈ Γ and suppose that A / ∈ M(Γ ) and B / ∈ M(Γ ). Then, ¬A ∈ Γ and ¬B ∈ Γ . So, by (M¬), ¬A ∈ M(Γ ) and ¬B ∈ M(Γ ). By (M∧) ¬A ∧ ¬B ∈ Γ . But, by hypothesis and the definition of ∨, ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) ∈ Γ , contradicting the fact that M(Γ ) is negation consistent.
Axioms 1-11 can be proved to hold in M(Γ ) just as in [8] . We need to show that axioms 12 and 13 also hold in metavaluations.
 7 If
A is an instance of axiom 12 or 13, then Γ | = M A, where Γ is a regular prime theory.
If, on the other hand, there is no Γ such that Γ | = M B, then all of them are such that Γ | = M C and so, by (M ), Γ | = M C and hence (ii) Follows directly from Lemma 4.
 8 (i) If for all prime regular theories
Γ , A → B ∈ M(Γ ), then A → B ∈ M(Γ ); (ii) if
 9 R.K − is characterized by the class of its normal theories, that is, R.K
− A iff A is in every normal theory of R.K − .
S S
The semantics that we will use is a version of the simplified semantics. The simplified semantics for relevant logics started out as a semantics for the boolean extensions of relevant logics. Hence, it was originally called a "boolean semantics". We will use the name simplified semantics, due to [16] , because we wish to show that the non-boolean logic R.K − is complete over it. We will then use this fact to prove that the boolean extension is conservative. But, before we present the simplified semantics, we will present the standard (or "non-simplified") model theory. An R.K − frame is a structure F = W, 0, R, S, * such that W is a non-empty set (of "worlds"), 0 is a non-empty subset of W, R ⊆ W 3 , S ⊆ W 2 , and * is a unary operator on W, such that the following definitions and semantic postulates hold:
SP4 is a partial order 
An R.K − model is a pair F, v , where F is an R.K − frame and v is a function from propositional variables to sets of worlds closed upwards under . v is extended to a satisfaction relation | = v (written merely as '| =' when no confusion will result) according to the following inductive definition:
A formula A is valid on a model if for all a ∈ 0, a | = A.
A hereditariness theorem holds of all R.K − models. That is, if a | = A and a b, then b | = A, for all formulas A and all worlds a and b.
The following lemma is useful when proving soundness results:
A simplified R.K − frame is an R.K − frame that obeys the condition SP11:
In other words, in simplified frames (and hence in simplified models) the partial order on worlds is an antichain. In R.K − models, the defined relation T acts like a modal accessibility relation in Kripke's sense. Whereas the derived truth condition for ♦ is
we can prove that
as well as
We can, with a few modifications, eliminate S in favour of T and make our semantics much more Kripkean [7] . But in simplified models S collapses into T , and we get the Kripkean truth conditions automatically.
The following theorem was proven in [12] . We repeat the proof here because of its importance for our completeness proof.
 11 (Clustering) If a ∈ 0, Rabb, and Rbcd, then Racc and Radd.
Proof: Suppose that a ∈ 0, Rabb, and Rbcd. Then, by SP5, there is some world x such that Racx and Rxbd. But, by SP11, c = x, so Racc. By SP7, Rbd * c * , so by SP5 again there is a world x such that Rad * x and Rxbc * . But by SP11, d * = x, so Rad * d * . Therefore, by SP7 and SP8, Radd.
This theorem tells us that around each base world there are a cluster of other worlds that are closed under the implications of the base world. Each cluster is closed under R. Our canonical model incorporates this closure in its construction. Moreover, the following theorem tells us that worlds can belong to only one cluster.
 12 If a, a ∈ 0, Rabb, and Ra bb, then a = a .
Proof: Suppose that a, a ∈ 0, Rabb, and Ra bb. By SP2, Rba b. So, there is a world x such that Rabx and Rxa b. Thus, by SP5, there is a world y, Raa y and Rybb. By SP11, y = a . So, Raa a . By SP2, Ra aa , and so a a . By SP11, a = a .
In addition to the clusters, we have an elegant embedding of an S4 model in each simplified R.K − model. Suppose that M = W, 0, R, S, * , v is a simplified
In addition, let L − be the implication free fragment of L. Then, we can extend v to a satisfaction relation between worlds in 0 and formulas of L − that obeys the same clauses as those for R.K − models. First, we can show that for any a ∈ 0, a ¬A iff a A. For, suppose that a ∈ 0. By SP1, Ra * a * a * . Then, by SP7 and SP8, Ra * aa. By SP2, Raa * a and so, by SP11, a = a * . So, a ¬A iff a A. That T 0 is reflexive and transitive is easy to show.
We constrain frames to accommodate our other logics in accordance with the following correlations between schemes and semantic postulates:
For soundness arguments for these schemes see [4] and [6] .
C
The completeness proof makes use of the clustering theorem 11 above and a trick from [17] . 3 The idea is that our canonical model is made up of a set of clusters. Each cluster is centred around a normal theory. In terms of the implicational R accessibility relation, the clusters are independent of one another. Worlds from one cluster are only related to worlds in other clusters by means of the modal S accessibility relation. Now, once we have isolated a cluster, we make use of the trick from [17] . The idea is that each base world is duplicated by a non-base world. That is, each normal theory is a base world, but also, in a separate guise, acts as a non-base world. We put special restrictions on the way that base worlds behave with regard to the R accessibility relation in order to verify that the canonical model is a simplified model. These restrictions would make the truth lemma (Lemma 24 below) extremely hard to prove. But having a doppelganger for each base world that behaves without the special restrictions allows us to prove it easily. For this reason we take a base world to be a pair of Γ, 0 where Γ is a normal theory. The pairing with 0 marks it out as a base world. A non-base world is a pair Σ, Γ , where Σ is a prime Γ -theory and Γ is a normal theory. Thus, in the cluster around Γ, 0 we also have its doppelganger Γ, Γ . The reason that we take a non-base world to be a pair of a prime theory and a normal theory is that the normal theory indicates to which cluster the world belongs. For consider the empty theory ∅. It is a Γ -theory for every normal theory Γ . Thus, in the canonical model we have ∅, Γ for each such Γ .
In order to set out our canonical model, we need a few more definitions. We define a fusion operator on pairs of sets of formulas Σ, Θ, such that Σ • Θ = {B : ∃A(A → B ∈ Σ ∧ A ∈ Θ)}. Σ • Θ is so-to-speak the modus ponens closure of Σ and Θ. Where Γ is a normal theory and Σ, Θ, Ξ are sets of formulas, R Γ ΣΘΞ if and only if for all formulas A and B, if Σ Γ A → B and • W Γ = { Σ, Γ : where Σ is a prime Γ -theory and Γ is a normal 
Here −1 a = {A : A ∈ π 1 (a)} and ♦ −1 a = {A : ♦A ∈ π 1 (a)}.
In order to show that this construction is legitimate, we need to show the following:
is also a Γ -theory.
Proof: Suppose that Γ is a regular R.K − theory and Σ is a Γ -theory. Assume that B ∈ Σ * and B → C ∈ Γ . Then, ¬B / ∈ Σ and ¬C → ¬B ∈ Γ . So, ¬C / ∈ Σ, hence C ∈ Σ * . Therefore, generalizing, Σ * is a Γ -theory.
 14 If Γ is a normal theory, then any prime theory
Proof: Suppose that Γ is a normal theory, Σ is a prime theory, and −1 Γ ⊆ Σ ⊆ ♦ −1 Γ . Because R.K − is closed under the rule of necessitation, for every theorem A, A ∈ Γ and so A ∈ Σ. Thus, Σ is regular. In addition, ¬♦(A ∧ ¬A) is a theorem of R.K − , so ¬♦(A∧¬A) ∈ Γ and, because Γ is negation consistent, ♦(A ∧ ¬A) ∈ Γ . Since Σ ⊆ ♦ −1 Γ for no formula A, (A ∧ ¬A) ∈ Σ. Thus, Σ is also negation consistent. Therefore, Σ is normal.
We now show that the canonical model is a simplified R.K − model. Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, instead of specifying, for example, that a = Σ, Γ and saying A ∈ Σ or writing A ∈ π 1 (a) (where π 1 is a projection function), we will merely write 'A ∈ a'. Similarly, we write a ⊆ b instead of π 1 (a) ⊆ π 1 (b).
 15 If Σ and Θ are R.K − theories and Ξ is a prime Γ -theory such that R Γ ΣΘΞ, then there are prime Γ -theories Σ and Φ such that Σ ⊆ Σ , Θ ⊆ Θ , and R Γ Σ Θ Ξ.
Proof: Suppose that Σ and Θ are R.K − theories and Ξ is a prime Γ -theory such that
Neither C nor C is in Ξ and both B and B (and hence B ∧ B ) are in Θ by the definition of ∆ Σ . Then, contrary to our assumption, it would not be that R Γ ΣΘΞ. Thus, we can extend Σ to a prime Γ -theory Σ such that R Γ Σ ΘΞ. Now we extend Θ to a prime Γ -theory Θ such that R Γ Σ Θ Ξ. Let ∆ Θ = {A :
We can see that (Θ, ∆ Θ ) is Γ -independent. For suppose that Θ Γ (A ∨ A ) for some A, A ∈ ∆ Θ . Then there are C, C / ∈ Ξ such that A → C ∈ Σ and A → C ∈ Σ . Then, by axioms 5 and 7, ((A ∨ A ) → (C ∨ C )) ∈ Σ . Since Ξ is prime, C ∨ C / ∈ Ξ. Thus, it cannot be the case that R Γ Σ ΘΞ. So, (Θ, ∆ Θ ) is Γ -independent. Now we extend Θ to a prime theory Θ such that R Γ Σ Θ Ξ ending the proof of the lemma.
We begin by showing that SP11 holds, because proving this makes it redundant to show that SP4, SP5, SP6, and SP9 hold, since they follow automatically from SP11.
Then, by the construction of the canonical model, a = b.
We also prove SP7 and SP8 out of order because we assume them in later lemmas.
But, by axioms 12 and 13,
Case 2. a ∈ 0 L . Then, by the construction of the canonical model,
Proof: By Lemma 1.ii, ((A → B) ∧ A) → B. So, suppose that A → B ∈ a and A ∈ a. Then, B ∈ a. Generalizing, a • a ⊆ a, hence R L aaa. Case 2. b ∈ 0 L . Then a = x and we have R L aba and R L acd. By the construction of the canonical model, we have R L bdd and, so by Lemma 20, R L dbd. But we already have R L acd, so there is a world y, namely d, such that R L acy and R L ybd. Case 4. c ∈ 0 L . Then we have x = d and R L abd. By the construction of the canonical model, we know that R L aca. Thus, there is a world y, namely a, such that R L acy and R L ybd. Proof: ⇒ by definition of R L .
⇐ Suppose that A → B / ∈ a. Case 1. a ∈ 0 L , that is, a is Γ, 0 , where Γ is a normal R.K − theory. Then, ({A}, {B}) is Γ -independent. So, by Lemma 2, there is a prime Γ -theory b that contains A and does not contain B. Since b is a prime Γ -theory, R L abb.
then there would be a formula C such that A → C ∈ a and C → B ∈ Γ . But since a is a Γ -theory, A → B would be in a, contrary to the hypothesis. By Lemma 2 we can extend a • {A} to Θ, a prime Γ -theory that does not include B. Let us call Θ, Γ , c. So now we have R Γ Σ{A}Θ where Σ and Θ are prime Γ -theories. So, by Lemma 15, there is a prime Γ -theory Ξ extending {A} such that R Γ ΣΞΘ. Let us call Ξ, Γ , b. So we have R L abc.
( −1 a, ∆) is independent. For suppose that −1 a R.K − ∆. Then, we would have C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ −1 a and
. By necessitation and the distribution of necessity over implication, we then get
Moreover, a is prime, so we have A ∈ a or ♦B 1 ∈ a, or. . .or ♦B m ∈ a. But none of these formulas is in a. So, by reductio, ( −1 a, ∆) is independent. Then by Lemma 2, we can extend −1 a to a prime R.K − theory Σ such that Σ ∩ ∆ = ∅. Now we construct a normal theory Γ such that Σ is a Γ -theory. Let Γ be the set of R.K − Theorems. Then, we know that R Γ Γ ΣΣ. By Lemma 15, there is a prime extension Γ of Γ such that R Γ Γ ΣΣ. In [8] , moreover, it is shown that each prime regular R.K − theory has a normal theory as a subset. Let us call a normal theory contained in Γ , Γ . Then R Γ Γ ΣΣ. Now we set b = Σ, Γ . Thus, there is a b in W L such that S L ab and A / ∈ b. Now we can prove the usual truth lemma. A ∈ Γ for all normal theories Γ . By Lemma 9, if A is in every normal theory, then R.K − A.
B N
The point of the completeness proof is to aid in proving that the addition of boolean negation to R.K − yields a conservative extension. First we add boolean negation, ∼, to our language, creating L ∼ . We construct a boolean extension, CR.K − , of R.K − by adding the following axiom schemes 4 The notion of validity remains as it is for R.K − .
We first prove soundness.
 26 (Soundness) Every instance of axioms C.1-C.5 are valid on all simplified models for CR.K − .
Proof: We note first that A ∨ ∼A is true at every world and that A ∧ ∼A fails at every world.
C.1. Suppose that a A and that Rabc and b B. As we have noted, c C ∨ ∼C. Hence, by the truth condition for implication, a B → (C ∨ ∼C) and, by Lemma 10, A → (B → (C ∨ ∼C)) is valid.
C.2. Suppose that a A. Also assume that a ∼( B → C), i.e., a (B → C).
By SP1, Raaa, so either a B or a C, that is a ∼B ∨C. Hence a ∼( B → C) ∨ (∼B ∨ C). Thus, by Lemma 10, A → (∼( B → C) ∨ (∼B ∨ C)) is valid.
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